Data fidelity : security’s soft underbelly by Sample, Char et al.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Sample, Char, Hutchinson, Steve, Cowley, Jennifer, Watson, Tim, Hallaq, Bilal and Maple, 
Carsten (2017) Data fidelity : security’s soft underbelly. In: IEEE 11th International 
conference on Recent Challenges in Information Systems, Brighton, UK, 10-12 May 2017. 
Published in: Proceedings of 11th IEEE RCIS conference (In Press) 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/89104       
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“© 2017 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be 
obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting 
/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective 
works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component 
of this work in other works.” 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Data Fidelity: Security’s Soft Underbelly 
 
Abstract—The events of 2016 created a growing concern over 
the weaponization of information. Weaponized information is 
actually a symptom of a larger problem, namely, data fidelity. This 
group of researchers began considering the impact and issues that 
associate with data fidelity in cyber security.  
Presently, a fundamental universal assumption existing in cyber 
security solutions is that the entered data being secured is an 
accurate, faithful representation of the actual events that are 
occurring in the real world. This assumption of data fidelity is 
present in every major cyber security product. This work-in-progress 
paper acknowledges the data fidelity problem, by providing a model 
that couples the data object with the environment in an attempt to 
reduce the potential for weaponized information, thereby improving 
data fidelity. 
Keywords—data fidelity; security assumption; data object; data 
environment, weaponized information. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The 2016 US presidential election resulted in the 
emergence of new terms such as “fake news”, “post-truth”, 
“weaponized information”, “disinformation”, and, more 
recently, “alternative facts”. All of these terms comprise the 
general problem, data fidelity. Although much attention is 
being directed toward the weaponized information (WI) [1], [2] 
in the political world [3], deployment of WI in the cyber 
security domain has not yet been considered; however, this can 
easily be considered a component of hybrid warfare [4]. The 
deployment of WI used against security solutions could be 
catastrophic [5]. Data publishers in the physical world have 
institutions such as Reuters, API, academia, and other 
institutions that can ultimately discern the truth of physical 
events. The virtual environment has no such equivalents. The 
veracity or fidelity of data created by cyber security systems is 
assumed to be correct. However, cyber security systems lack 
effective mechanisms to ensure data fidelity. 
In the physical world, events can sometimes be verified 
through the use of the human’s five senses (sight, sound, smell, 
touch, and taste). The virtual world, where computers are 
modeled on the human mind [6], has constructs for sight, 
sound, and in some cases touch, but not the remaining senses. 
Thus, the ability to examine data for fidelity in the virtual 
environment is impaired while the opportunity for successfully 
entering bad data remains. An implicit level of trust is placed 
in the machines, and although the machines themselves may 
have reliable security tools, these machines and their tools are 
presently incapable of inspecting the fidelity of the actual data 
that is entered. As the case of Stuxnet illustrated, the use of 
digital certificates gave the appearance that the malware was 
legitimate [7], even though data fidelity was compromised. 
Security specialists can point to various security solutions 
designed to ensure that entered data was not altered through the 
use of data integrity solutions [8], [9], [10]; however, these 
solutions are all based on the assumption that the data put into 
the security solution faithfully represents reality. In order to 
understand the fidelity of data, we must first agreed upon 
several aspects of the data. These items include the definition 
of the data along with the environment or the situational 
awareness as these data relate to the data object (DO). The 
modification history or provenance associated with each of 
these items requires examination collectively and individually. 
The researchers believe (1) that coupling the DO with the data 
environment (DE) creates the context for the data element in 
which the data were created and (2) that the resultant value will 
provide the requisite accuracy and exactness necessary to 
assure a high level of data fidelity. 
This research focuses on modeling a method for validating 
and tracking the fidelity of security data entered into a security 
system. The model proposed is a work in progress, and, as 
such, it does not present as a full solution. The authors 
welcome feedback and suggestions that can contribute to the 
robustness of this model.   
II. LITERATURE REVIEW WEAPONIZED INFORMATION  
In the physical world, two-person or multi-person control 
of critical systems that handle critical operations is an example 
of an early trust model [11]. Because the process now is 
automated, two-person control on security data is not 
practical. However, the model requiring the validation and 
verification by two entities on the same object is relevant.  
A case in which perception and reality differed in the 
virtual environment was witnessed with Stuxnet [12], [13]. 
Although, Stuxnet is now considered an old attack, one of the 
key features of this malware was the deceptive capabilities 
[12], [13] that convinced the operator through normal alert 
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processing that the system was operating as expected when in 
reality the centrifuges were out of control [12]. In other words, 
the display data was not a faithful or accurate representation of 
actual events happening in the systems. This was a clear case 
of disinformation in a security system where perception 
management was successfully deployed [13]. 
 
 
 
 
a. Taken from: http://communicationtheory.org. 
Fig. 1. Gerbner’s Model of Communication (reproduced from [14], [15] with 
permission). 
In order for two entities to effectively communicate, both 
entities must perceive the same message [14], [15]. This 
perception relies on (1) context or (2) an environment 
intertwined with the actual object. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
relationship between object and environment for sending and 
receiving entities. Gerbner’s model defines the relationship 
between the observer’s perception and reporting the 
perception between the reported data. The perception by the 
final recipient is not addressed. This important area is 
recognized as one of the emergent research areas resulting 
from this work. 
A. Defintions 
Weaponized information in the political sense occurs when 
malevolent actors subvert or abuse the content or the release 
time of data to achieve their goals [16] of sowing confusion, 
creating doubt, paralyzing decision making, demoralizing 
readers, or blackmailing targets [16]. The application of these 
attributes of deception in cyber security environments can 
have similar effects of sowing confusion, creating doubt and 
paralysis, or deceiving operators to change the security 
posture based on misinformation. 
Szfranski [1] characterized WI as a message content-based 
attack on knowledge or beliefs. Cybenko et al. [17] refers to 
these attacks as cognitive hacks (CH). CHs decompose into 
overt CHs (OCHs) and covert CHs (CCHs). Traditional 
techniques to defend against OCHs include authentication and 
data integrity checking technologies such as encryption and 
digital signatures. Defending against CCHs is more difficult 
because the goal is to validate the data, not the entity that 
enters the data [17]. 
Data has fidelity when it contains a true, accurate, and re-
creatable set of components that comprise an information 
element. The information element minimally contains both the 
data object and the environment in which the data were 
created. The resulting objects that result from creating data 
fidelity are a hashed value of the data object and a hashed 
value that contains the data object coupled with the 
environment in which the object was created. 
B. Goals 
Pomerantsev and Weiss [16] enumerated the following 
goals for weaponized information: confuse, blackmail, 
demoralize, subvert, and paralyze. These goals serve to blur the 
line between truth and fiction. Thus, the goal for this data 
fidelity model is to offer independent modeling to determine 
the fidelity of input data in highly critical environments. When 
data appear to fail the fidelity test, a secondary goal will be to 
provide clarity and offer potential explanations to what has 
changed about the data.  
 Before we discuss the importance of data fidelity for 
technical security solutions, we need to be clear about the ways 
that data fidelity can be undermined along with the existing data 
security controls. 
 Historically speaking, the three fundamental constructs of 
data security are confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
[18]. Confidentiality ensures that only the intended viewers 
are able to view the message content [18], and this is most 
commonly achieved through encryption and authentication. 
Data integrity, oftentimes achieved using encryption or digital 
signature technologies, ensures that the message content 
remains unchanged once entered [18]. Availability, usually 
achieved through redundancy, assures the user that the data 
are ready for use when needed [18]. Non-repudiation, where 
senders cannot deny sending a message and similarly 
recipients cannot deny message receipt [18], is oftentimes 
added as a fourth data security pillar, and data provenance can 
be used to support non-repudiation. 
 As a clarifying example, consider a Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS). Briefly, a NIDS monitors one or 
more network segments, inspecting frames/packets and 
matching their contents against a set of rules that specify 
patterns/signatures of interest and their corresponding alerts, 
which are sent to network security responders [19]. The NIDS 
runs on one (or more) computer while interacting with the 
computer’s operating system to receive network data access, the 
data ruleset, process the rules, and send alerts [19]. 
 An attacker wishing to undermine the NIDS data fidelity has 
several opportunities, including the following: (1) sending 
overlapping fragments of data packets that the NIDS 
reconstructs in a different way from the destination computer, 
thus presenting harmless data to the NIDS but malicious data to 
the target computer; or (2) compromising the NIDS host 
operating system to hide network data from the NIDS or to alter 
its rulesets, processing, or alerts. The network security 
responders will in turn find that the data they are reliant on to 
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judge the security of the network becomes the equivalent of 
fake news, thereby influencing them in ways that are 
advantageous to the attacker. 
 If we widen our scope to include other security solutions, 
we can see that firewalls are very similar in function to NIDS, 
processing incoming network data from its network interfaces 
and forwarding, dropping, or modifying them according to its 
rules and internal state [20]. Firewalls share identical issues 
with data fidelity as NIDS. 
 Many technical security controls rely on forms of 
encryption. Although arguably not strictly data, all of these 
protections rely on a good source of random binary sequences 
when generating ciphertext, digital signatures, and blocks 
within a Blockchain or cryptographic hashes. If the randomness 
is compromised (for example, through various types of entropy 
attack on an operating system or hypervisor), then the 
encryption can be catastrophically weakened [21].  
 The self-protection systems typically included in technical 
security solutions protect against integrity attacks through the 
use of remote logging, hashing, and signing of data and 
encryption and the hardening of processes and filesystems [22]. 
However, the data they rely on arrives from a supply chain of 
upstream components (i.e., in the case of NIDS: host operating 
system, network interface controller, upstream network 
segments, switches, and routers), any of which might be 
deleting, inserting, or altering the data in some way. 
 Network situational awareness has been considered as a 
method to focus attention on potential problems on the network 
[23]. These Netflow-based monitoring systems traditionally 
only examine the header field of the packet, leaving the data 
field alone. Although these solutions may detect some changes 
in the size of the payload and the rate of data flow, the best that 
they offer is an indicator of potential fidelity problems, not 
evidence or proof. 
 Application input validation offers some protections such 
as bounds checking and prevention of buffer overflows, and 
both techniques are data-centric solutions [24]. However, due 
to the variety of data ingested, application input validation 
checks are also vulnerable to data fidelity problems. These 
solutions are unaware of specific details concerning the data; 
instead, these solutions provide general data checking that is 
applicable in a variety of environments [24].  
Authenticated sources that enter bad data are described in 
the Byzantine General’s problem [25]. The Byzantine 
General’s problem is believed to be solvable through fault 
tolerance. Cybenko et al. [17] also invoked the Byzantine 
General’s problem and suggested multiple sources or a fault-
tolerant approach to deal with CH. However, another approach 
mentioned by Cybenko et al. [17] suggested evaluating data 
within context. Due to the amplification of bad data, this effort 
favors the use of data within context. 
 Although the technical solutions discussed thus far provide 
necessary aspects of data security, they fail to assure data 
fidelity upon input. Furthermore, the systems are natively 
incapable of providing the validation and verification of the 
fidelity of data being input, thus resulting in a large and 
exploitable gap that will grow as deception techniques 
continue to gain in popularity [21]. 
III. SCENARIOS 
There are two versions of this processing model for 
consideration: a full feature version and a lite version. The full 
feature version allows for deeper analysis with a full history 
using a modified technology based on the Blockchain ledger, 
hereafter referred to as the Blockchain ledger. The lite version 
relies only on the hashed values of the data and the 
environment. Also of note, the out-of-band (OOB) path for any 
object is considered the protected path. 
The following abbreviations will assist the reader in the 
scenario and processing discussion: DO, DE, good (g), bad (b), 
out-of-band path (o), security information and event 
management (SIEM) path(s). 
 When the data are initially entered, the environment is 
inspected to determine whether it supports the event being 
recorded. For example, if the data object shows an alert 
indicating that resources are full, environmental values such as 
memory usage or process resource usage can easily be checked 
to determine whether the data are correct. Once verified, the 
DO is signed and coupled (DO, DE). 
The environment includes the source from whence the data 
came, variables with which the data object interacts (i.e., 
process size, memory usage for the process, connection 
information, etc.), and a capture of connection identifying 
information and other relevant data. The DE, although signed, 
is not fully trusted until the (DOs, DEs) pair is compared 
against (DOo, DEo) pair. 
There are four general scenarios that we will address for 
this exercise. We have purposely not included cases where the 
SIEM system detects bad object or environmental values, 
because by the time the SIEM detects such problems, too much 
damage has already occurred. The use of the OOB monitoring 
system should create scenarios in which the shadow system 
outputs will not match the SIEM outputs. These mismatched 
scenarios are the scenarios of interest for this effort. For this 
discussion, the SIEM system includes all of the components of 
a SIEM system.  
A. Scenario 1: Good data object, good SIEM environment, 
and OOB match.  
In this case, the DO and the DE values are the same when 
SIEM and OOB compare results. This scenario is used as a 
control case.  
(DOs, DEs) = (DOo, DEo)  
In the new discussion, an example of this would be the 
report of a building fire, where the camera crews zoom in on 
the site while firefighters are seen fighting the fire. The story 
(data object) being reported matches what is sensed in the 
environment. However, in the virtual environment, when an 
alert is generated, this signal indicates that a specific source IP 
address attempted access on a specific targeted port. In 
addition to the alert being generated, the same source address 
was accessible, and the command history shows the source 
host attempting to reach the target address on the specified 
port. In this particular case, ground truth data are complete. 
 
 
B. Scenario 2: Good data object, bad environment, SIEM and 
OOB mismatch on environment. 
 
((DOs, DEs) <> (DOg, DEo)) AND ((DOs = DOo)     
  AND (DEs <> DEo)) 
 
This scenario suggests that data are being used out of 
context, and data must be sent for further interpretation. In 
many cases, this environmental perturbation may be in the 
normal range; therefore, the lite version can be configured to 
default pass with logging, whereas the full version will 
associate with more actions. 
Re-visiting the example of the fire and the burning 
building, the scenario depicts fire fighters fighting the blaze; 
however, in this instance, the background has changed, that is, 
night replaces day. If we looked strictly at the object, even 
digitally signed, the object would be considered valid.   
In a related security example, this is one of the events that 
occurred with Stuxnet [12], [13]. Although the alert messages 
came through normal channels, the environment was most 
certainly not normal [12], [13]. Some mild environmental 
perturbations are normal for objects, and, in the full version, 
these ranges will be in the archive; however, in the lite 
version, this process will require a manual response. 
C. Scenario 3: Bad data object, good environment, SIEM and 
OOB mismatched on data object. 
 
((DOs, DEs) <> (DOg, DEo) AND (DOs <> DOo) AND 
(DEsg = DEog)) 
 
This scenario involves a change to the object that does not 
perturb the environment. In the example using the news story 
and the building fire, the color of the building may change 
from red to brown. In that case, the environment would appear 
undisturbed, but the object’s characteristics would be 
different. In a virtual environment, a false alert could be 
injected into a good status to divert resources.  
D. Scenario 4: Bad data, bad environment.  
 
((DOs, DEs) <> (DOg, DEo)) AND ((DOs <> DOo) AND 
(DEs <> DEo)) 
 
In this scenario, both the object and the environment do 
not match. As a result of this discrepancy, an immediate error 
condition will be generated.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE I. GERBNER’S MODEL PHYSICAL-CYBER EQUIVALENCES  
 Model Example Cyber Example 
E Fire, in house, fully 
involved, no nearby 
objects. 
Anomalous event data on a 
network, or in a system 
process 
E1 Perception of E Sensing, sampling of some 
attributes associated with the 
event E 
M Observer of the event E Sensed data match to rule, 
generating alert 
S Statement message 
conveyed through an 
available channel to M2 
Log message sent to security event	 monitor/collector 
(SIEM) 
E2 The perception of E, 
generated by M1, 
filtered through channel 
to M2 
The alert message content, 
timestamp, where the context 
of E1 are assumed to be the 
same as the context of E2 
M2 Uses the materials 
available from S|E2, 
using assumptions 
about the context of E 
Uses the alert (available 
materials) to enter into a 
security workflow, to inform 
analyst(s) about the event (E) 
described by S|E2, assuming 
equivalent contexts 
 
IV. PROCESSING 
We propose a model solution that is applicable for each of the 
given scenarios. This proposed solution relies on the use of a 
modified version of Gebner’s model to accommodate recipient 
perception management, digital signatures, and digital ledger 
technology. The researchers recognize that key management is 
a critical component of this solution; however, for this paper, 
key management is out of scope. Regardless of which version 
is used, lite or full, some background information is required.  
 Furthermore, the researchers have determined that the out-
of band process that runs as the check against the well-known 
security solutions should run in a stealthy manner. At 
minimum, the kernel should be modified [26], allowing the 
processes to be hidden from view in the system process table. 
The connections established should also be secure and not 
visible. The logging capabilities, although able to use the 
system logging mechanism (a configurable option), will still 
have a parallel logging process that provides the interface 
directly to the item being monitored. Thus, the untampered 
item has been entered through machine interactions and not by 
human to machine input.  
For each scenario, two sets of processing actions will be 
discussed: the first is for lite processing, and the second is the 
full version, which uses an archive system that allows for 
deeper analysis. The archive system is present for the full 
system and uses Blockchain technology in the archive to create 
and manage the digital data element ledger. Fig. 2 illustrates 
the processing associated with the archive. 
Each DO is recorded and associated with the estimate of 
the current observation context. If, at a later time, an 
observation context (environment) is found to be “bad”, then 
all DOs associated with that context are likely to be bad as 
well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Model with out-of-band context records sent to a ledger.  
TABLE II. DATA LEDGER ENTRIES RECORDING CONTEXT CHANGE HISTORY 
Estimates of environment 
(context instances at time) 
Data objects with links to context 
Context 1 (t1+) DO1( t >= t1 ) 
 DO2( t > t1 ) 
Context 2 (t2+) DO3( t >= t2 ) 
Context 3 (t3+) DO4(t >= t3 ) 
Context 4 (t4  ) DOfuture( t >= t4 ) 
 
A. Scenario 1 
Upon element creation, two hashes are created: one for the 
element containing the (DO, DE) pair and another for the DO. 
A comparison between the checksums for (DO, DE) pairs is 
made, and when the coupled pairs match, the lite version 
discards the new information. The full version can be 
configured to create a permanent version that can be archived 
for provenance purposes on the archive system.  
B. Scenario 2 
Upon element creation, two hashes are created: one for the 
element containing the (DO, DE) pair and another for the DO. 
A comparison is made, and when the checksums do not match, 
the data object checksums are compared. If the DOs and the 
DOo are equal, it implies that the objects are the same but the 
environment has changed. The lite version would result in the 
operator manually examining the environment and 
determining whether the discrepancy is benign or not. The full 
version would use the DO as the index into the archive. The 
archive contains DE entries that pair with the DO, and each 
status indicates whether the event is benign or not. In addition, 
the Blockchain would be entered into the archive for later 
processing. This secondary processing would allow for 
examination of the changes to determine the point where the 
data became less reliable. 
C. Scenario 3 
Upon element creation, two hashes are created: one for the 
element containing the (DO, DE) pair and another for the DO. 
A comparison is made, and when the checksums do not match, 
the data object checksums are compared. If the DOs and the 
DOo are not equal, it implies that the object has changed. The 
lite version would result in the object being automatically 
invalidated. The full version would begin by extracting the DE 
values for comparison. If DEs and DEo are equal, then the 
problem is with the object not the environment. The DOo will 
act as the index into the archive. This scenario processing 
would result in the Blockchain for the object being entered 
into the archive for later processing. Secondary processing 
would allow for examination of the changes to determine the 
point where the data became less reliable. 
D. Scenario 4  
Upon element creation, two hashes are created: one for the 
element containing the (DO, DE) pair and another for the DO. 
A comparison between the checksums for (DO, DE) pairs is 
made, and when the coupled pairs do not match, the DOs and 
DOo hashed values are compared when they do not match the 
environments are extracted and compared when they do not 
match, the lite version discards the new information. The full 
version can be configured to create a permanent archive that 
can be inspected and compared for provenance purposes on 
the archive system.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This proposed model relies on combining digital 
signatures and aspects of Blockchain technologies on security 
data that are tightly bound to the defined environment, 
creating a coupling for evaluation when environmental or 
object states change. Cybenko et al. [17] recommended a 
similar solution in his work on CH, where he also stated the 
importance of accurate baseline data. This solution also relies 
on accurate baseline data that are stored in the out-of-band 
comparison system.  
Cybenko et al. [17] also considered solving CH through 
modeling using the Byzantine General’s problem [25]. The 
algorithmic solution for the Byzantine General’s problem 
becomes resource intensive and may still fail to solve the data 
fidelity problem in the current data-rich environments that 
comprise security systems today. Furthermore, weaponized 
information is amplified, and the majority of bad data when 
modeled using the Byzantine General’s solution will be 
accepted as good, faithful data.  
This proposed model presents a non-traditional use of 
digital signatures and Blockchain technologies [27], [28] as a 
method of providing details that can be forensically used to 
reconstruct, with greater accuracy, the point in time where 
events crossed from benign to problematic. While certainly 
not a comprehensive solution, this work represents a potential 
first step in an ongoing process to begin the process of solving 
a security challenge that has recently gained prominence in 
 
 
 
another environment, and it will likely present with greater 
frequency in the virtual environment. 
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